REPARATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ORIGIN
STORY
John Linarelli*
In The Misery of International Law, my co-authors and I
argued that “[w]e really cannot understand structural and institutional
forms of racism only by looking inside the borders of the Western
states because these borders were used in a long history to maintain
slavery and exploitation in the New World and ‘civilization’ in the Old
World.”1 We did not pursue this claim further because our focus was
on a critique of how the international law on trade, investment, and
finance have perpetuated injustice in the economic sphere and how
international human rights law has been ineffective in addressing that
injustice. I will extend the point further here, if only very summarily
in the form of a short essay: we cannot fully understand the reasons
why reparations for African Americans or Native Americans are
necessary from a moral standpoint, and why legal grounds must be
created to put these moral obligations in a collective form for our
political community to deal with, unless we historicize and globalize
the inquiry. Why? Extending our study in this way tells us about the
origins of the United States, the social and historical conditions of its
formation, and how those origins and conditions played a role in the
very problems that call for reparations. Study of history and law
beyond our borders also will inform us that the American experience
is not unique and that we may be able to develop our own law and
institutions for repair based on a fuller understanding of how the
wrongs of the past did not limit themselves to our current borders or
are more immediate circumstances. The modern state came into being
as an idea, constructed in the social world, on the foundations of
colonialism, slavery, exploitation, subjugation, and a violent
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restructuring of the global economy. Many “new world” states like the
United States came to be, at least in some initial conception, in this
period of what the historian Sven Beckert calls “war capitalism,”2 the
first big move towards a global economy.
The origins of the United States as a country is in the context
of its settler colony origins, in which the settlers replace the indigenous
population through domination (and some might argue genocide3) to
develop a distinctive identity eventually coalescing into a national
identity grounded in the sovereignty that international law affords a
state.4 In the United States, and in some other settler colonies,
however, the settlers did not only replace the indigenous population
with settlers. They also enslaved others from distant lands to do much
of the work in what is primarily an agricultural society at the time. I
am no historian. My training and published work are in law and
philosophy. I will therefore tread lightly here on the historical
questions. The consequences of this history for our Constitution and
other institutions could be understood to result in a skewed conception
of political freedom and equality which we must constantly work to
overcome. Settler societies are rooted in notions of self-rule and
participation in political processes, but apparently only for the settlers
and their descendants and for people permitted to enjoy membership
as free citizens.5 Freedom in these societies appears to rest on a
contradiction: freedom for some but subordination for others, with
each granting or denying of agency working simultaneously at a given
moment in time.
What is the normative force of these historical events on our
current social conditions? What should we do? We should think of
the question not as injustice brought on by persons that can be
identified, but as injustice that we as a people in a political community
can repair. Moral blame is not attributable to individuals for past
wrongs, but for failure to deal with our shared past today in some form
of collectively agreed redress.
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I. THE LAW OF NATIONS AS RATIONALIZATION FOR CONQUEST
Let’s start with the origin story for international law, in what
was once known as the law of nations. This has been a popular move
by international legal scholars to search for the origins of injustice in
the world order and in the material inequalities between states. As the
law that got states started, it is hard to deny that it influenced current
law and set the stage for the social outcomes currently in place for
modern states. This work is the so-called historical turn in
international law. The historical turn led to a debunking of the
“romantic” vision of the origin story as the beginning of an
international society of states under the rule of law set by international
relations theorists such as Hedley Bull6 and legal scholars such as
Hersh Lauterpacht.7 The post-colonial or critical wing of the historical
turn in the study of international law critiques the modernist vision of
international law as “progress” towards higher forms of “civilization”
or humanitarianism. It has addressed the problems of economic
injustice in the international law. This work exposes the foundations
of international law in western conquest of newly “discovered” lands.8
An influential movement in this world of ideas is known as
Third World Approaches to International Law or TWAIL for short.9
The history of the law of nations has played an important role in
TWAIL work. While TWAIL came to be in the aftermath of the Cold
War, and with the rise and fall of the movement towards a New
International Economic Order (NIEO), the NIEO movement died but
TWAIL thrives, even with its anachronistic use of the phrase “third
world,” a phrase with little currency anymore with the Cold War long
gone.
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Unease persists from some historians about this work,
particularly historians in the contextualist school, who contend that
historical work must only be read in the context of its time and not to
be applied to present circumstances or seen in a causal light as a
precursor to the present.10 But to classify the work of critical theorists
and some historically oriented TWAILists as history is a category
mistake: they are not doing history, or more precisely, they are not
writing either on the history of political thought or on the history of the
law of nations or international law. Rather, they are doing legal
sociology and exposing the background conditions for norms and
structures of rule-governed hierarchies propagating injustice across
generations and between communities.
An important critical and TWAIList claim is that international
law is unjust and illegitimate because of its historical roots in colonial
conquest by Westphalian-inspired western European states of
“discovered” peoples and lands. This conquest, so the historical
account proceeds, led to the evolution of a system of states and an
international law that perpetuates injustice. The result is the
perpetuation of a system of law that enforces domination, subjugation,
exploitation, and various other ills. While the anachronism
counterargument has been deployed against these claims and more
traditionally minded international legal scholars find the arguments too
sweeping in their condemnation, the rebuttal resides in a powerful
counterfactual: we really cannot get off the ground to change the
persistent tragic outcomes that keep perpetuating themselves in the
world until we detach ourselves from the bias of the status quo and
reimagine what international law and state formation might be like
today if their beginnings were not rooted in the inhumanity of war
capitalism.
What follows is only a very partial summary of the rules as they
were understood at the time of “new world” conquest. I divide the law
of the time into two components, one on subjugation of the indigenous
10
Anne Orford, International Law and the Limits of History, in THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS: READING MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI (Woulter Werner, Mariecke de
Hoon & Alexis Galán, eds., Cambridge University Press 2018): 297; Martti Koskenniemi,
Histories of International Law; Significance and Problems for a Critical View, 27 TEMPLE
INTL & COMP. L. J. 215 (2013). The methods of the Cambridge contextualist school are found
in 1 QUENTIN SKINNER, VISIONS OF POLITICS: REGARDING METHOD 86-87 (Cambridge
University Press 2002). For an article that is reasonably friendly to the lawyers, see Andrew
Fitzmaurice, Context in the History of International Law, 20 J. HIST. INTL L. 5 (2018). I am
grateful to Natasha Wheatley for directing me to the Fitzmaurice article.
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population and the other the legal rationale for enslaving Africans and
forcing them to move to new lands to produce a radical transformation
that resulted in the origins of the global supply chain economy. Again,
to repeat a note of caution: this is a very short essay offering only a
summary level of discourse.
These two sets of legal justifications were the product of
Renaissance humanism. Some who read this essay may find my
sources of law odd. Where are the cases, statutes, and constitutions in
the argument? We do not teach our students that law is a historically
contingent enterprise. My apologies to the Dworkinian jurisprudes,
but there is no way to avoid the claim that legal positivism has at least
a strong hold on lawyers today.11 We look for a source of positive law
from some institution such as a court or a legislature. But this has not
always been the case, and indeed it has only recently been the case. In
the history of human societies, legal positivism is a relatively new
theory of law, arising to prominence in the latter nineteenth to early
twentieth centuries.12 Before then, natural law played an important
role in legal thought. Before about 1850, American lawyers would
have agreed that murder is a distinctive legal wrong even if no nation
at all had any statute or case law making it so.13 According to a lawyer
who accepts natural law as form of law, murder is a legal wrong
because it was contrary to the law of nature.14 As legal historian Stuart
Banner explains, in about 1850, it would have been entirely normal for
a lawyer in court to use the law of nature as well as statutes and case
law, but that today “if a lawyer tries to discuss natural law in court, the
judge will look puzzled, and opposing counsel will start planning the
victory party.”15 That was about 1850. Go back several hundred more
years, to the 1500s. In the time of the Renaissance, positive law ranked
low as a source of authority for law.16 At the time, there was some
diversity of understanding about the sources of law. Indeed, asking for
a source is a question that a legal positivist would emphasize. But let
me try to summarize. First in rank was God’s law, unknowable to
11

See GERALD J. POSTEMA, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE
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humans.17 Second in rank came natural law, available to all rational
beings with the capacity to reason, universal in its application to every
person.18 After that came the jus gentium, also universal in its
application to every person, which either included or was understood
as a law of nations, though whether it was purely natural law or a mix
of natural law with common social understandings of law was subject
to some diversity of views.19 The lowest law in the pecking order was
positive law, a law that was not universal and enacted by sovereigns to
govern particular human societies.20 The result of this mix was that
jurists, some of whom we classify as philosophers today, could render
binding legal opinions for sovereigns on the jus gentium or the law of
nations and on natural law. Philosophers and lawyers were in
indistinct category. Hence, why we proceed by examining the great
proclaimers of the law of nations, who offered reasons for monarchs
to kill native populations and enslave Africans in the conquest of the
new world during the Renaissance.
The Renaissance jurists, who international lawyers have
characterized as the “founders” of international law, claimed that the
law of nations is the product of reason about universal principles about
what is right, with the universal presupposed as European. The law of
nations, to these jurists, is a mainly natural law that is or is derived
from reason, though their use of jus gentium as a concept could
sometimes rest on what we might call social practices today. The law
of nations in this conceptualization is universal. It mandates rights and
duties to all rational beings. To fail to comply with it is irrational and
those who fail to comply must be punished by those who do comply.
So, the law of nations is a totalizing and universal product of reason
that all must accept. Reason and rationality, however, happen to
produce just those normative practices that Europeans happen to
accept.
Here we see an argument for cosmopolitanism, but it
immediately is in contradiction. The universals were European and
not universal. The law of nations was a Eurocentrically constructed
law of cultural practices, not a natural law founded in the state of nature
and common to all. The idea here was that each person, European or
native to what became the Americas, possessed natural legal rights as
17
18
19
20
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free and rational persons, and were obligated to comply with natural
legal duties. It was a rational act and a moral duty, then, for European
Christian nations to use force to punish violators and compel
compliance.
We could focus on all or several Renaissance jurists such as
Grotius, Gentili, or Vitoria. I will focus on Vitoria’s conception of the
law of nations, widely understood, according to legal historian Robert
Williams in his seminal text, The American Indian in Western Legal
Thought, as the jurist who took the “first critical steps towards a
totalizing jurisprudence of international order – a law of nations
intended to regulate all aspects of the relationships between
independent states.”21 Vitoria’s work came about seventy years before
that of Grotius. They share the same universalizing logic for the
authority of a law of nations. One of his lectures, De Indis et de Jure
Belli Relectiones, given in 1539, was of special relevance to the
development of what we now classify as international economic law.
Williams classified this work as the first by a major Spanish
Renaissance jurist “to embrace the full implications of the Thomistic
Humanist idea that a natural-law connections existed between all
nations from which arose a system of mutual social rights and
duties.”22
In summary, Vitoria’s argument proceeded as follows:23
Indians are rational persons with the capacity to reason and are bound
by natural law. They are therefore bound by jus gentium, a form of
natural law administered by sovereigns. The law of nations, to Vitoria,
was either natural law or derived from natural law.24 Because the
Indians are so bound, they cannot interfere with the right of the Spanish
under the jus gentium to travel on Indian lands and trade with the
Indians. The Indians have the same right to do these things in Spain.
It is an act of war to keep the Spaniards out or to limit their activities
and Spanish retaliation is permissible in such cases. Moreover, Indian
social and cultural practices violate the jus gentium and they can
remedy these violations by adopting European social and cultural

21
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT 96
(Oxford University Press 1990).
22
Id. at 97.
23
Linarelli, Salomon, & Sornarajah, supra note 1 at 111-127; Anghie, supra note 8, 1331; ANDREW FITZMAURICE, SOVEREIGNTY, PROPERTY AND EMPIRE, 1500-2000 (Cambridge
University Press 2014).
24
Williams, supra note 21, at 98.
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practices. Europeans can use force to achieve the transformation.25
Consent by the Indians is irrelevant, and resistance is an act of war, a
violation of the law of nations. The Indians lack sovereignty as a
nation because of their violations and only Christians can wage just
war against them forcibly to transform their practices. The rules of just
war do not apply to the Indians. Europeans can kill or enslave their
women and children if they fail to comply.26 Other founders of
international law, Gentili and Grotius, stated the law similarly. Similar
themes preoccupied the legal opinions justifying conquest for all
colonizing nations, including Britain. The focus here on Vitoria and
Grotius is by way of illustration and because they are widely
understood to be the most prominent of jurists on the origins of the law
of nations.
This law of nations set the stage for the rise of the global
capitalism and the multinational corporation. Grotius’ De Indis, an
apology for Dutch aggression in what is now known as southeast Asia,
articulates what Locke will later call the ‘very strange doctrine’ that in
the absence of the law of the state as it is found within the state, each
person in nature is morally identical to the state and has the power to
punish for violations of the law of nations.27 So, for example, the
Dutch East India Company, the Vereenigde Oost-Indische
Compagnie or VOC for short, was justified, at least according to
Grotius, in enforcing natural rights of trade and occupation through use
of force. The VOC, probably the second multinational company after
that of the British East India Company (EIC),28 had the right to
conclude treaties with foreign powers, to wage war, and to levy taxes.29
25
According to Vitoria, the Indian’s “social and cultural practices are at variance with the
practices required by the universal norms.” Anghie, supra note 8, at 327. That is, “the
particular cultural practices of the Spanish assume the guise of universality as a result of
appearing to derive from the sphere of natural law.” Id. at 326.
26
According to Anghie, “we see in Vitoria’s work the enactment of a formidable series of
maneuvers by which European practices are posited as universally applicable norms with
which the colonial peoples must conform if they are to avoid sanctions and achieve full
membership.” Id. at 332.
27
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Hackett 1980) §9, 10; HUGO
GROTIUS, DE JURE PRAEDAE COMMENTARIES, ed & with an Introduction by M Julia van
Ittersum (Liberty Fund 2006) Ch. 1; HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, ed & with an
Introduction by R Tuck (Liberty Fund 2005) Ch II.
28
The British East India Company was the first joint stock company and the VOC the
second. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF
POWER, PROSPERITY & POVERTY 247 (Profile 2013).
29
FEMME S. GAASTRA, THE DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY: EXPANSION AND DECLINE
(Walburg Pers 2003).
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The EIC maintained its own armed forces of about 200,000, more than
most European states of the time, and could call on the Royal Navy
and Army for support if needed.30 These chartered companies were
the first companies permitted to organise on a limited liability basis.
The EIC sold shares on the Royal Exchange.31
The second leg of the legal argument for developing the global
supply chain economy was in the notion of “natural slavery,” though
it must be said that a variety of bad legal arguments, and sometimes
very little, justified slavery. As Martti Koskenniemmi explains in the
context of British conquest, “[a]stonishingly, a racialist system of
plantation slavery arose in the Atlantic colonies without a clear basis
either in the common law colonial legislation or the lex mercatoria.”32
Arguments ranged from the common law does not apply to conquered
lands, slaves were war captives who can be taken as slaves, buying
slaves differed from enslaving, and Christ lived in Roman times when
there were slaves but was silent on the subject.33 We could go on.
These and other arguments were deployed to justify the enslavement
of Africans and to remove them to the Americas to serve as forced
30

Beckert explains:
[P]rivate capitalists, often organized in chartered companies (such as the British East India
Company asserted sovereignty over land and people, and structured connections to local
rulers. Heavily armed privateering capitalists became the symbol of this new world of
European domination, as their cannon-filled boats and their soldier-traders, armed private
militias, and settlers captured land and labour and blew competitors, quite literally, out of the
water. Privatized violence was one of their core competencies. While European states had
envisioned, encouraged, and enabled the creation of vast colonial empires, they remained
weak and thin on the ground, providing private actors the space and leeway to forge new
modes of trade and production. Not secure property rights but a wave of expropriation of
labor and land characterized this moment, testifying to capitalism’s illiberal origins.
Beckert, supra note, 2, at 37.
31
NICK ROBINS, THE CORPORATION THAT CHANGED THE WORLD: HOW THE EAST INDIA
COMPANY SHAPED THE MODERN MULTINATIONAL (Pluto Press 2nd ed 2012); HV BOWEN, THE
BUSINESS OF EMPIRE: THE EAST INDIA COMPANY (Cambridge University Press 2009); JOHN
KEAY, THE HONOURABLE COMPANY: A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY
(Harper Collins 1993); PHILIP LAWSON, THE EAST INDIA COMPANY: A HISTORY, 1600-1857
(Routledge 1993); William Dalrymple, The East India Company: The Original Corporate
Raiders, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 4, 2015; William Dalrymple, The East India Company: The
Company That Rules the Waves, THE ECONOMIST, Dec 17, 2011.
32
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, TO THE UTTERMOST PARTS OF THE EARTH 758 (Cambridge
University Press 2021), citing ALAN WATSON, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAS 636 (University
of Georgia Press 1989). The lex mercatoria or law merchant was considered to be the
commercial law of this period, based not or not primarily in the law of states, but a
transnational law that applied much in the same way as the law of nations, but to merchants.
See John Linarelli, Global Legal Pluralism and Commercial Law, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM 689 (Paul Schiff Berman ed. Oxford University Press 2020).
33
Koskenniemi, supra note 32.
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labor in a new global economic structure. Look at cotton for example,
long a product of households that planted cotton with food crops. The
British used violence and a corporation with its own armed forces to
transform cotton production into an industry, removing it from its
center in India to production of crops mainly in the southern United
States, with manufacturing of cloth and cotton products in northwest
England. This was a violent restructuring to form a global supply chain
for Europeans to extract maximum rent from the process while
impoverishing longstanding producers, middlemen, and traders.34
Slave made commodities dominated world trade between 1600 and
1800, creating great wealth for Europeans.35 One of the significant
differences between “new world” slavery of this period and slavery in
the ancient world and in the Middle East and Africa at other times was
its connection to global trade. Slaves in the ancient world were part of
household economics. Slaves in the new world supported large-scale
production of major commodities such as sugar and cotton, sold on
world markets.36
What does this tell us about reparations? It tells us about the
origins of states, the populations that inhabit them, and the institutions
and social practices that resulted from this conquest and which persist
to this day or influence current institutions and social practices. In
other words, it tells us about structural racism. From this origin story
eventually comes the movements and revolutions that brought about
the states that we know of today in the “new world.” The United States
is one of these states. The United States (as a state and in its prior form
as separate colonies) was not the only country that imported slaves.
The United States (and its predecessor colonies) imported a relatively
small percentage of enslaved people in the new world between 1500
and 1870 than Brazil, Spanish America, the French Caribbean, and the
British Caribbean.37
34

Beckert, supra note 2.
For a small sampling of research in the vast field of the study of the transatlantic slave
trade, see Atlantic Slavery and the Making of the Modern World, 61 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY No. s22 (Oct. 2020).
36
There are many sources for these points. See.e.g., ROBIN BLACKBURN, THE MAKING OF
NEW WORLD SLAVERY 10 (Verso 2d ed. 2010). Another significant difference between “new
world” and “ancient” slavery was that new world slavery was racialized.
37
Henry Louis Gates Jr., How Many Slaves Landed in the U.S.?,
https://www.pbs.org/wnet/african-americans-many-rivers-to-cross/history/how-many-slaveslanded-in-the-us/ (last viewed July 8, 2022); James N. Green, Brazil, Five Centuries of
Change, https://library.brown.edu/create/fivecenturiesofchange/chapters/chapter-3/slaveryand-aboliton/ (last viewed July 9, 2022).
35
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These states were created in conditions in which certain
imperial subjects were free and others were not. The United States is
widely understood to have its origins in the status of a setter colony, or
a collection of settler colonies established under a common imperial
authority. What started as a collection of settler colonies transformed
after independence into a settler empire.38 A settler colony is a colony
supported by an imperial authority that eliminates indigenous peoples
and cultures in a territory and replaces them with a settler society.39
Notions of liberty and freedom in the settler colony origins of the
United States are republican, as that concept is understood in a long
tradition in political philosophy. Whatever the merits of republican
political theory, in the United States, republicanism was the support on
which one group, the settlers, declared themselves to be free, while
others in out-groups, the enslaved and indigenous peoples among
them, were unfree and subjugated. The subjugation that was so natural
to the law of nations seems to have made its way into the law of
states.40
II. THE CONTRADICTIONS
STATES

OF

FREEDOM

IN

SETTLER COLONY

In political philosophy, there are three prevalent ways to
understand the concept of liberty. One of the most common
understandings to Americans is that of negative liberty. Negative
liberty is freedom from interference from others, usually taken to mean
freedom from interference by the state. Positive liberty is the freedom
to act or possess the ability to act in ways that allow one to take control
of one’s life and realize one’s ends. A third conception of liberty is
known at republican liberty: freedom from domination. In the
republican conception of liberty as non-domination, freedom does not
require that you not be subject to interference by government. The law
will necessarily involve some interference in one’s liberty. Rather,
what liberty requires is that you not be subject to the arbitrary or
discretionary will of others. “Others” includes private agents and is not
38
AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 12-13 (Harvard University Press
2010).
39
LORENZO VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW (Palgrave
Macmillan 2010).
40
See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, TO THE UTTERMOST PARTS OF THE EARTH (Cambridge
University Press 2021).
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limited to government. In the republican conception of governing, the
law protects citizens from domination by others. The law itself must
be promulgated and enforced in a way that avoids domination too, in a
system of government that is participatory and of your own making,
and not alien or controlled by a foreign power or prince. The animating
ideas here, in summary, are that freedom from private domination is a
requirement of justice while freedom from public domination is a
requirement of political legitimacy.41 Republicanism is opposed to
liberalism, which rests on the notion of negative liberty, and which
came to be known as classical liberalism in support of a minimalist
state, offering no philosophical support for protection from nondomination.
“Republican” or “republicanism” refer to a long tradition in
political philosophy tracing back to ancient Rome. Republicanism was
a theory about the legitimate ways of governing that at the time of the
War of Independence was seen as in contraposition to monarchical
rule. It rests on three conceptions: (1) equal freedom for all citizens,
with freedom as understood as non-domination; (2) a mixed
constitution that imposed a range of constraints on government power,
denying control to any one individual or body, and (3) an active
citizenry that demonstrates the public and private virtue to monitor and
challenge government policy and law-making.42 These features of
republicanism can be found in Roman thought, in the thought of
medieval and Renaissance humanists, and later in the short lived
English republicanism of the mid-seventeenth century.43
While English republicanism failed as an actual form of
governing in Britain, republican ideas became hugely influential in the
eighteenth century, during the period of the American Revolution.
They were a mainstay of eighteenth-century political thought and
furnished the foundation for the case for American independence.44
There is a substantial consensus among historians on the influence of
republicanism on colonial America at the time of the American
Revolution.

41
PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND MODEL OF
DEMOCRACY 3 (Cambridge University Press 2012).
42
Id.
43
Philip Pettit, A Brief History of Liberty – and its Lessons, 2015 J. HUMAN DEV. &
CAPABILITIES 1 (2015).
44
Rana, supra note 38; GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(Vintage, 1991).
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The focus here is not on republicanism as political thought, but
in how, when put into action, human psychology overrode its ideals,
with the tendency of humans to group and engage in tribal
identifications of insiders and outsiders. In his Pulitzer Prize winning
book, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, historian Gordon
Wood identified as radical to the American Revolution the idea that
every property-owning45 man is “equally free and independent.” This
break from European monarchy, argues Wood, had “radical and
momentous implication for Americans.”46 Unlike in countries ruled
by monarchies, in America with its republican government, there were
to be no “patron-client relationships” or “multiple degrees of
dependency” that put men subject to the will of another.47 This was
understood as a position in which man was truly free. But as John
Adams said in 1775, “[t]here are but two sorts of men in the world,
freemen and slaves.”48 The distinction between free man and slave,
between man and his dependents, put slavery into what Wood
characterizes as of “conspicuous significance.”49
From its early origins in the Roman Republic, republicanism in
action has had a membership component, which limits who enjoys
freedom and who suffers domination. In actual politics, this
membership component has overridden any robust conception of
liberty to be extended beyond all but a limited number of persons in a
society. The Romans had slaves, who were unfree because subject to
the will of their masters. The Romans used the Latin dominatio to
describe the living conditions for their slaves.50 In the eighteenth
century, republican liberty was maintained by imperial authority that
undermined the ideal of liberty itself.51 Eighteenth century liberty,
embedded in the American Constitution, rested on a contradiction. The
American founders sought to eliminate all hierarchy in their new
society, but they went about putting that elimination in action in a way
that maintained and institutionalized in their new Constitution a
45
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significant hierarchy, that between white Protestant property-owning
men and everyone else, all of whom had their socio-cultural roles and
identities – women, children, property-less men, and slaves. As the
relevance of monarchical rule receded what came pronounced in this
political framework was the membership problem. The promise of
freedom in the United States has linked historically to domination.
Today we talk of the moral equality of each human person. This ideal
was not at work at the time as we understand it today. As the American
project continues, the move has been toward expanding membership,
a reconceptualization of the citizen with rights to take part fully in state
governance and society.
If I had more time and space, I would explore how legal
rationalizations for conquest in the law of nations connect to theories
of property rights for settlers and the political frameworks within new
states that institutionalized freedom and domination. Much as the law
of nations divided old and new worlds as between Westphalian
sovereigns and conquered territories, the law of states that emerged
from the conquest produced sharp divisions between the free and the
unfree. The British took essentially a Lockean view in their conquest
of North America, furnishing them with the permission to appropriate
property by engaging in European-style cultivation of land.52 There
was no misappropriation or dispossession of the indigenous population
in this action in their view, as the natives left land “lying waste in
common” and therefore held no rights to it.53 From these origins came
the plantation economy and a grounding of republican freedom in
exclusion and domination. These themes pervade the development of
constitutional orders in the United States and in other countries with
settler colony origins.
III. CONCLUSION
This short essay only scratches the surface of many themes,
which I hope gives the reader some exposure, however limited, to the
idea that we must understand the current structure of the American
state and American society from historical and global points of view.
This approach furnishes a richer context of our origin story based in
conquest, how that conquest was justified, and how those justifications
52
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influence how our society and constitutional order is structured today.
An historical and global inquiry might help us fashion better remedies
for historic injustice and better explanations for why those remedies
are morally obligatory. This inquiry just might help us achieve that
“more perfect union.”54
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